To profit from crowdsourcing, organizations can engage in four different approaches: microtasking, information pooling, broadcast search, and open collaboration. In this paper, we present 21 governance mechanisms that can help organizations manage their crowdsourcing platforms. We investigate the effectiveness of these governance mechanisms in 19 case studies and recommend specific configurations of these mechanisms for each of the four crowdsourcing approaches. Also, we provide guidance to organizations that host a crowdsourcing platform by providing recommendations for implementing governance mechanisms into their platforms and building up governance capabilities for crowdsourcing.
Introduction
New information technologies have empowered companies to tap into the creative potential, distributed work pattern, and expansive knowledge of huge online crowds. Crowdsourcing has been established in various business fields since crowds may solve certain problems faster, better, and cheaper than companies are able to in-house. 1 Today, 84 per cent of the world's most prestigious companiesincluding SAP, Dell, Google, General Electric, Fiat, LEGO, and Procter & Gamble -have started to build their own crowdsourcing platforms. 2 This article supports organizations in managing crowdsourcing by providing recommendations for implementing effective governance on their crowdsourcing platforms.
The premise of crowdsourcing is that a crowdsourcer invites a group of individuals or teams to solve a specific task via an IT-based crowdsourcing platform. 3 For instance, General Electric (GE)
launched -in collaboration with various venture capitalists -a crowdsourcing platform called
Ecomagination Challenge. The main objective of this "broadcast search" was to obtain novel technologies to improve GE's innovative strength. In accordance with its long-term strategy, GE defined certain themes in the domain of sustainability and invited contributors, including Internet users, business partners, academic institutions, and startups, to submit innovative contributions. In total, over 60,000
contributors from more than 160 countries contributed 5,000 ideas. In 23 of those ideas, GE and its partners invested more than 140 million USD. Since then, GE has regularly used the Ecomagination platform to engage in new crowdsourcing projects. 4 Similarly, the toymaker LEGO launched LEGO Ideas in which more than 700,000 contributors collaborate with the toymaker in order to develop new toys. To date, each of the jointlydeveloped toys has completely sold out. 5 These examples illustrate the great potential of crowdsourcing and shed light on the pivotal role of crowdsourcing platforms in ensuring the success of large-scale collaboration and problem solving approaches. Such platforms serve as technical and organizational infrastructure for managing and maintaining an emerging community of contributors and define how crowdsourcers and contributors can interact. Appropriately managing crowdsourcing platforms is of paramount importance for many organizations. It involves the creation of scalable structures and repeatable mechanisms for governing the simultaneous interactions between thousands of independent and distributed contributors. For instance, LEGO faced considerable scaling problems when its community of contributors grew rapidly.
The company was no longer able to dedicate sufficient attention to its most active and most important contributors. As a result, LEGO developed a reputation system based on gamification elements including points, badges, and rankings. This reputation system meant that contributors could verify and signal their status on the platform and maintain motivation and participation. 6 However, not all organizations master their governance challenges. For instance, Villa Enterprises created an "information pooling" platform in cooperation with PepsiCo. On the Dub the Dew platform, customers could suggest and vote on names for a new apple-flavored Mountain Dew soft drink. However, the companies had no means for effectively controlling the appropriateness of the contributed soft drink names. When contributions like "diabeetus" or "fapple" were voted to the top, the platform was shutdown resulting in a public relations disaster. 7 General Motors, the Kraft Heinz Company, Henkel,
McDonalds, or the conference organizer TED have had similar negative experiences. 8 Establishing effective governance is not only about creating mechanisms for incentivization or assuring the quality and appropriateness of a large quantity of contributions. Organizations must also develop scalable approaches for defining self-explanatory tasks that contributors can process independently, allocate tasks to appropriate contributors, and, eventually, regulate misbehavior of contributors. 9 Once established, such mechanisms enable crowdsourcers to use their crowdsourcing platform more effectively and in a continuous fashion for conducting crowdsourcing projects.
In this article, we present a comprehensive set of 21 governance mechanisms for managing crowdsourcing platforms. Based on a qualitative research approach, we investigate the effectiveness of these governance mechanisms across four different types of crowdsourcing, i.e., microtasking, information pooling, broadcast search, and open collaboration. Based on the results of this study, we suggest a specific set of governance mechanisms for each crowdsourcing type that should help organizations establish effective governance. Finally, we provide four suggestions for building up governance capabilities for crowdsourcing.
Four Types of Crowdsourcing
In practice, there are a variety of crowdsourcing platforms that generate distinct contributions.
For instance, the Fiat Mio platform -on which contributors collaborated in order to develop a new concept car 10 -is completely different from the GE Ecomagination Challenge -where contributors compete against each other. In the case of Fiat Mio, contributions are likely to be small and reflected by sharing, commenting, editing, or integrating ideas for further developing the car in a collaborative fashion. 11 Consequently, appropriate governance has to account for controlling the behavior of contributors during collaboration. In contrast, GE's Ecomagination Challenge does not require substantial collaboration among contributors. It facilitates an innovation contest in which each contribution reflects an independent and exhaustive solution to a specific crowdsourced task. Therefore, implementing mechanisms for governing collaboration is not necessary. However, such contests usually attract a high number of alternative contributions of which only a small number are truly innovative.
Thus, mechanisms that permit the control and evaluation of contribution quality are more important. 12 These examples illustrate that a differentiated analysis is needed when approaching governance mechanisms for crowdsourcing platforms. Drawing on the work of Geiger and Schader 13 , we distinguish crowdsourcing platforms by the diversity and aggregation of contributions that are created on them:
(1) Diversity: Contributions can be homogeneous (i.e., they are characteristically identical) or heterogeneous (i.e., they differ in their individual qualities). Homogenous contributions are highly standardized and are usually the outcome of well-structured tasks. For instance, in many voting tasks, a contribution is defined by the number of stars that can be given to an object being voted on. 
Broadcast Search
Broadcast search platforms collect contributions to solve a task in order to gain alternative insights and solutions from people outside the organization. These contributions are highly heterogeneous as each contribution may reflect an alternative solution to the crowdsourced task. 
Governance Mechanisms for Managing Crowdsourcing Platforms
Governance within online communities refers to the system for organizing rules and processes that regulate and orchestrate the behavior of community members. 18 In such IT-facilitated environments, governance is conveyed by specific mechanisms that incorporate these rules and processes. In crowdsourcing, governance involves structuring roles and responsibilities, formal and informal rules, standards and regulations, outcome control measures, communication processes, or matters of task allocation in order to achieve the crowdsourcer's goal. In a previous research project, we identified 21 distinct governance mechanisms for crowdsourcing that can be organized into six groups. * We describe these governance mechanisms below and summarize them in Exhibit 2.
 Task Definition encapsulates mechanisms that enable the precise, understandable, and repeatable definition for crowdsourced tasks. These mechanisms involve approaches for modularization so that the task can be split into (a multitude of) smaller subtasks of higher granularity in order to create simpler and self-explanatory tasks where results can be easily evaluated. 19 Defining contribution requirements helps contributors to understand both how anticipated contributions should look and also the evaluation criteria. 20 Pretesting involves testing tasks with a small group of contributors prior to their publication on the platform.
 Task allocation means the invitation of a specific group of contributors to participate in solving a task. In this way, crowdsourcers can invite contributors with specific skills (e.g., design professionals or individuals with a specific technical background), demography (e.g., age or income), or past performance (e.g., contributors that have completed similar tasks in the past successfully).
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 Quality assurance involves the evaluation of contribution quality. Quality assurance involves manual control, in which all or a subset of contributions are checked manually to determine whether they meet defined requirements. Quality assurance might also involve automated control, which comprises of the IT-facilitated validation of contributions. 22 Finally, peer assessment uses contributors to approve valid contributions from their peer contributors.
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 Incentives are the means for motivating and activating the crowd to conduct tasks. 24 Incentives may include financial compensation in terms of payments or prizes, e.g., USD 1000 for the winner in an innovation contest. However, beyond money there are various other extrinsic incentives. For instance, reputation systems such as rankings or experience levels allow contributors to signal their standing within a platform's community of contributors. 25 By contrast, mechanisms such as framing, e.g., presenting tasks so that they appear meaningful to contributors or offer contributors the opportunity to receive feedback regarding the quality of their contributions address intrinsic motivations of contributors. 26 Similarly, socialization enables contributors to communicate and interact with peers and is often appreciated by contributors.
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 Qualification mechanisms help achieve and retain a "qualified crowd" and include peer coaching, e.g., experienced contributors answer questions from their less experienced peers and help them successfully solve tasks, or tutorials, e.g., text-based descriptions that explain how to solve different tasks. Finally, platforms can implement onboarding processes that frequently test specific tasks, which can then infer the expertise of single contributors. 
Determining Effectiveness of Governance Mechanisms
Our central argument is that different crowdsourcing platforms require a distinct set of governance mechanisms. In order to determine the effectiveness of governance mechanisms across the four crowdsourcing types, we followed a qualitative research approach. We investigated the governance structure of well-established company-hosted and intermediary-based crowdsourcing platforms. 30 Companies can interact directly with the crowd by creating their own platform (e.g., LEGO Ideas) or utilize "crowdsourcing intermediaries" whose business model primarily aims to provide crowdsourcers access to qualified contributors for a platform fee (e.g., InnoCentive). 31 Company-hosted platforms may be better integrated in an organizational context and adapted to the crowdsourcer's overarching strategy.
By contrast, crowdsourcing intermediaries -for whom governing contributors and continuously designing, implementing, and refining governance mechanisms is business-as-usual -are likely to employ sophisticated governance patterns. Thus, we considered both to be highly appropriate and complimentary data sources.
The purpose of our study was to identify effective governance mechanisms. Our assumption was that effective mechanisms evolve over time as organizations administering crowdsourcing platforms learn which mechanisms are best for their operations and which are not. For instance, a company may initially implement a mechanism aimed to better regulate collaboration behavior of contributors. If this mechanism is not effective for promoting the desired behaviors, the crowdsourcing platform's managers will abandon it and, instead, create and implement a new mechanism to attain the desired goal. This form of organizational learning is more likely to be realized by well-established crowdsourcing platforms. This is why we focused our data collection on platforms that have attained a "steady state."
We investigated a total of 19 platforms. For each platform type, we studied at least four typical platforms. We acquired data primarily by interviewing C-Level executives, founders and co-founders, and operation managers of the crowdsourcing platforms. Exhibit 3 provides an overview of the crowdsourcing platforms and interviews we investigated. implemented for what purpose), and their effectiveness (e.g., how and why certain mechanisms became more effective over time). Our secondary data was acquired by observing the platforms and reviewing additional platform material. We also reviewed additional documentation including company presentations, governance guidelines, and data freely available on the Internet. Where possible, we accessed the platforms from the perspective of both crowdsourcers and contributors in order to follow several projects from cradle to grave and gain a nuanced understanding of the perception and effects of the governance mechanisms. Thus, we were able to observe how governance mechanisms shape a platform's entire crowdsourcing process, which ensured that we could validate and refine our interview results.
EXHIBIT 3. Description of Data Sources

Effective Governance Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Platforms
In this section, we offer effective sets of governance mechanisms for each type of crowdsourcing and provide a comparison.
Microtasking
Organizations that host a microtasking platform should consider governance mechanisms that are primarily geared towards assuring an appropriate quality of contributions. They should develop mechanisms that enable them to modularize tasks and to define contribution requirements clearly and to automatically check contribution quality. In supporting this goal, incentives such as payments and a reputation system are also important. Below we explain these suggestions in more detail. 
Automated Quality Control:
The large quantity of contributions is also a challenge for quality control. Whenever possible, crowdsourcers should opt for automatization. Our results demonstrate that relatively simple measures, which could easily be adapted by many crowdsourcers, prove to be effective.
For instance, Contentmaster -where contributors primarily write small texts for online shopsautomatically counts whether the number of words in a contribution surpasses the minimum number of words as defined in the contribution requirements. Also, Contentmaster's employees write sample texts for a series of tasks and note the time taken to complete the task. Contentmaster then tracks the time taken by contributors to complete the task, and compares it with the time taken for the sample texts. By contrast, Clickworker employs a more sophisticated approach. For instance, the Honda Research Institute Europe, a client of Clickworker, asked contributors to mark road signs and obstacles on more than 10,000 photos and to answer driving-behavior related questions. Clickworker inserted specific "control tasks" for which the correct answer is known and where results are easy to quantify, e.g., small
quizzes. The control tasks were distributed with the regular tasks to contributors. Based on the results for the control tasks, the platform could automatically check the validity of contributions for each contributor. If contributors made maximum effort on all tasks, given that they were not aware of the control tasks, Clickworker can assess the response quality of the regular tasks. However, in addition to automating quality control, crowdsourcers should also check contribution quality manually via random sampling.
Payment: Organizations engaging in a microtasking platform should consider financial payments as primary incentive. In microtasking, each contributor who contributes a complete and valid solution that satisfies the task requirements is paid. Our results show that the exact remuneration offered for solving a single task usually depends on the time needed for completion as well as its complexity.
Most commonly, payments range between 20 cents and a couple of dollars. Clickworker and Contentmaster aim to pay their contributors about 10-15 USD per hour. This is above the current minimum wage in Germany, where both platforms are based. We suggest that organizations follow this example. Existing research also shows that offering performance-based bonus payments for high quality contributions increases the quality of results. 33 However, only one of the investigated microtasking platforms -CrowdFlower -used such a remuneration scheme in a systematic fashion. The other ones do not use it on a large scale as performance bonus payment significantly increases the complexity of crowdsourcing projects as it is onerous to determine the quality of contributions. However, in each case, crowdsourcers must ensure payment structure transparency so that contributors are able to determine remuneration before they begin a task.
Reputation Systems: We suggest hosts of microtasking platforms to install a reputation system with which contributors can signal their skills, expertise, or participation level. Such systems are used by almost all investigated microtasking platforms. These systems effectively complement financial incentives and increase the effort exerted by contributors. Such systems address the desire of contributors to stick out of the community of contributors. In microtasking, reputation systems can be effectively combined with financial rewards. For instance, CrowdFlower and Contentmaster award experience levels for their contributors that allow access to specialized and better paid tasks. Thus, contributors are very keen to achieve higher reputation levels.
Authentication: All investigated microtasking platforms implemented some sort of authentication for verifying the identity of contributors. Organization may consider authentication because taking contributors out of anonymity enforces them to perform their task more accurately and helps prevent misconduct.
Information Pooling
Organizations intending to establish an information pooling platform should implement a governance structure that focuses on helping contributors submit high quality information using definitions of contribution requirements and tutorials. Non-financial incentives and allocating tasks based on demographic attributes are also advisable. We describe governance mechanisms for information pooling below.
Contribution Requirements:
To aggregate results efficiently, clear contribution requirements must be defined. BahnScout is a crowdsourcing app where passengers of Munich's urban rail system can report damages and litter at train stations. The train station operator aggregates these contributions with information gathered from other sources. Based on this aggregated information, the train station operator creates work plans for its service personnel. However, for this aggregation, the crowdsourced information needs to correspond to the internal IT system's structure that is used to manage service personnel. To achieve this, BahnScout has defined clear contribution requirements, e.g., include a picture of the issue, a textual description, the precise location, a predefined category, and potential hazards.
Demographic-Based Allocation of Tasks:
Organizations seeking to apply information pooling should recognize that contributors voluntarily participate in crowdsourcing. This has a significant drawback, particularly if organizations use information pooling for aggregating opinions, assessments, or experiences from a distributed group of contributors for internal decision-making processes. Due to the voluntary nature of participation, most contributors are personally interested in a certain task or project. Consequently, results may be positively biased and not representative. 34 Therefore, organizations should focus on integrating diverse and independent contributions. In this way, demographic-based task allocation may help to attain a realistic representation of how different target groups (characterized by the contributors) perceive a product or service. For instance, Streetspotr applies crowdsourcing techniques for point of sale retail execution. Contributors report how they perceive product presentations at the point of sale, e.g., shops or supermarkets. Streetspotr deliberately allocates tasks to both customers and non-customers of the product.
Reputation Systems and Framing:
For information pooling platforms, non-financial incentive mechanisms such framing and reputation systems are most effective, in particularly when they build upon each other. This is particularly the case at BahnScout, where contributors predominantly consist of train enthusiasts. As the social recognition among their peers is highly important for such specialized interest groups, the managers of BahnScout have created a reputation system that consists of multiple integrated mechanisms. After registration, contributors have only limited access to the functionalities of the crowdsourcing app which expands with rising reputation. For each contribution, contributors receive "experience points" which lead to nine different "experience levels" from "Beginner" to "Train
Conductor." With each experience level, new functionalities are unlocked, e.g., being able to comment and validate other contributors' reports. Also, BahnScout awards various badges in order to surprise contributors, e.g., it introduced a "winter service" badge for reporting icy conditions at train stations when a blizzard hit Munich. Based on the experience points, levels, and badges several rankings and leaderboards are created. This reputation system proved to be highly effective for BahnScout. However, organizations developing such reputation systems should consider that they consist of more than just awarding points, levels, and badges. Managers of BahnScout put significant effort in aligning these mechanisms into an overarching narrative that conveys the sense that contributors become part of Munich's urban rail system team. Thus, BahnScout's reputation system conveys a sense of achievement, while it also addresses the contributors' desire for "glory." In order to achieve these objectives substantial effort was made in finding the right pace of reputation progress. For instance, when the platform initially launched progress was much too slow; it was not rewarding enough to participate. This was resolved by adjusting the thresholds for attaining the different experience levels. However, when adjusting these levels, BahnScout recognized the need for transparency when making such adjustments.
The most experienced contributors perceived the revision as devaluing their hard-earned reputation.
Reputation systems may also be combined with payments to speed up information collection. For instance, CP Alpha conducted a project for an oil company where contributors were invited to describe their experiences at the company's gas stations. For this specific project, contributors could transfer their "experience points," which they obtained for participation, into vouchers that could be redeemed at the company's gas stations.
Tutorials: Small text-based instructions on how to report accurate information are effectively used by most investigated information pooling platforms. Such step-by-step guides help standardize the collection process of information.
Broadcast Search
Organizations that engage in broadcast search should consider governance mechanisms that are geared towards carefully defining contribution requirements and providing appropriate financial incentives. In fact, prizes should be considered as a central prerequisite for broadcast search. Payments for participating should also be considered, particularly if a group of contributors with specific skills are included within the broadcast search, e.g., design professionals. Below, we explain governance mechanisms for broadcast search platforms.
Contribution Requirements: Solving complex or creative tasks on platforms optimized for broadcast search usually allows for a great degree of freedom. Thus, organizations should develop precise definitions of contribution requirements to ensure that results can be implemented in practice.
For instance, jovoto, a broadcast search platform for innovation, requires its clients to provide precise descriptions of the problem, background, aim(s), and specific requirements necessary for implementation. Based on this information, innovation contests with clearly defined requirements for valid contributions are offered on the platform.
Skill-and Demographic-Based Allocation of Tasks:
Completely open approaches to broadcast search tend to create a lot of "noise", resulting in many low-quality contributions. In order to receive a manageable number of contributions without substantially reducing the chances of their quality, organizations should consider focusing their broadcast search on groups of contributors with proven abilities. 35 In this regard, jovoto frequently offers "invite-only" projects that contributors must complete an application process to work on. Only "jovoto Pros" are eligible to apply. To achieve jovoto Pro status, contributors must apply with a portfolio of their creative work, which is then verified by jovoto. An alternative approach is to focus the broadcast search on a specific target group. For instance, the software producer SAP created a broadcast search contest among students hoping to receive suggestions for improving SAP-related education at universities. Similarly, Testbirds, which applies the principles of broadcast search to test software, frequently restricts its software tests to contributors with specific hardware and operating systems.
Prizes and Payment:
For broadcast search, our results indicate that financial incentives are particularly important. Organizations should recognize that competition and prizes are integral to broadcast search. For instance, at jovoto the contributor who contributes the best solution receives a financial prize that usually ranges between 5,000 and 10,000 USD while the other ones frequently receive nothing. However, jovoto recognized that competing for such prizes is perceived as risky by many contributors. To ensure broad participation, jovoto usually offers multiple prizes that may also reward runner-up contributions or progress prizes that award the best contribution at the halfway point of the contest. Sometimes, jovoto also offers a payment. This is often the case for invite-only projects where usually between five and ten contributors are invited. Payments usually range between 500 and 1,500 USD. Testbirds applies a similar incentive scheme. It offers a payment for ensuring participation and a performance-based premium for each software bug detected. However, the performance-based premium is only paid for the first contributor who contributes a particular bug. For a contributor, a software test usually takes between one and two hours and the total financial compensation may range between 10 and 20 USD an hour. Also, for broadcast search, it is vital to communicate the terms of compensation upfront.
Manual Control and Peer Assessment:
To ensure quality assurance, manual control is inevitable as the entire value of the crowdsourcing project is likely to be concentrated in a single contribution, e.g., the most innovative product design or a highly critical security issue. 14 Manual control reduces the chance that these contributions are overlooked. It also prevents poor evaluation through community voting, where excellent contributions are frequently overlooked by contributors. 15 However, our results indicate that some of the examined broadcast search platforms employ "experienced" contributors who check the validity of contributions, which are subsequently evaluated in manual control activities.
Open Collaboration
For open collaboration platforms, modularization of tasks that structure the collective effort of contributors alongside incentives that appeal to intrinsic motivations are often highly effective. In In this specific context, modularization corresponds to breaking down the overarching goal of the platform into sub goals, which can then be processed in a project-like fashion. For instance, DGM ThinkTank is a crowdsourcing platform for patients that suffer from ALS (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) and encourages them to jointly develop solutions to simplify the life of those affected by ALS. To structure the task, managers of DGM ThinkTank created a series of themed weeks that addressed topics such as housekeeping, mobility, and nutrition. These themed weeks resembled time-bound campaigns to address these specific topics. In so doing, the managers of DGM ThinkTank were able to activate its community of contributors and ensured a wide range of responses. Also, the structure prevented the crowd from working on unrealistic contributions. To further investigate topics that were raised in these themed weeks, the managers of DGM ThinkTank created permanent "channels" within the platform which encouraged more frequent collaboration.
Peer Assessment: Due to the collective nature of open collaboration, peer assessment is an effective mechanism for quality assurance. In this way, quality control can be achieved by letting contributors verify the contributions of other contributors. For instance, at DGM ThinkTank, contributors with greater experience (e.g., contributors with the role "responsible worker") may exclude inappropriate contributions after discussion with other contributors. 
Comparative Analysis and Discussion
Having outlined the effective bundles of governance mechanisms for the four different types of crowdsourcing, we now discuss their effectiveness across platform types. Exhibit 4 summarizes the effectiveness of different governance mechanisms. 36 In this paper, we focused on presenting the most effective governance mechanisms that are used by investigated platforms within a given crowdsourcing type. However, Exhibit 4 also shows moderately effective mechanisms that are effective for at least some platforms within a given crowdsourcing type.
EXHIBIT 4. Comparing Effective Governance Mechanisms Across Types of Crowdsourcing
 Task definition is highly important for all crowdsourcing types. Organizations should consider their crowdsourcing platforms as infrastructure for regularly conducting crowdsourcing projects where specific tasks are broadcasted to the crowd. This requires approaches for systematically converting business problems into tasks that can be crowdsourced in a repeatable fashion. However, a decision for a certain crowdsourcing approach may create path dependencies in terms of what types of tasks can be broadcasted to the crowd. Organizations need to develop effective task definition mechanisms that can be applied to a variety of business problems and transform these problems into a structure that can be crowdsourced on a given platform. In this regard, task modularization and contribution requirements are particularly important. These mechanisms enable crowdsourcers to accurately describe their tasks to contributors. This facilitates processing of tasks by a large number of distributed contributors. By contrast, the pretesting of tasks and the contribution requirements can be considered as optional, for when crowdsourcers are not certain that these descriptions are selfexplanatory.
 Task allocation permits the invitation of a specific group of contributors. Our results suggest that allocating tasks based on demographic characteristics is most important for information pooling platforms because it may help increase the diversity of contributions. Thus, demographic-based task allocation may mitigate self-selection effects of contributors and helps to ensure appropriate coverage of the most important groups of contributors. Skill-based task allocation is more effective in broadcast search, while performance-based task allocation can be considered as being moderately effective for microtasking platforms. On these two crowdsourcing platforms, task allocation mechanisms help distribute tasks to contributors with proven abilities in order to receive a manageable set of high quality contributions. However, besides these potentials, organizations engaging in crowdsourcing should also be aware that implementing task allocation mechanisms is costly. They require building up a large crowd, involve various data collection and profiling efforts, and may complicate the processing of crowdsourcing projects. For instance, crowdsourcing platforms must be designed in a way that only contributors meeting the previously defined requirements are able to access tasks. Also, assembling project-specific crowds of contributors may increase a project's runtime.
 Quality assurance is a challenge across all crowdsourcing approaches. Although we outline several governance mechanisms that increase the possibility of obtaining high quality contributions, e.g., task definition and allocation mechanisms, managers should bear in mind that these mechanisms do not substitute for continuous quality control. Even well-defined tasks can be misunderstood and even the best contributors may submit low quality contributions. 37 Thus, quality assurance should not be exercised as ex-post evaluation but rather during the entire runtime of crowdsourcing projects so that organizations can intervene and improve contribution quality by giving direct feedback or taking other measures. In this regard, the implementation of manual control is inevitable to a certain degree, e.g., checking contributions in random samples. To date, this is both the most basic and the most effective approach across all platforms.
Automated quality control can be used effectively for microtasking platforms. Peer assessment has been shown to be particularly effective in open collaboration and broadcast search.
However, when competition among contributors is introduced, peer assessment mechanisms must be designed very carefully because competition may spur misconduct. and evolving rules of participation since even small changes might have a large impact on how they contribute. Thus, it is crucial to establish transparency on why certain regulations are implemented, how they are used, and if necessary, why they are changed. This is particularly true when using financial incentives.
Recommendations for Building Governance Capability for Crowdsourcing
Above, we have identified effective governance mechanisms for different crowdsourcing platforms and have also provided guidance on how to implement them. Now, we offer four overarching recommendations which should help leaders and managers of crowdsourcing platforms in building up governance capabilities for crowdsourcing (see Exhibit 5).
EXHIBIT 5. Building Up Governance Capability for Crowdsourcing
Define Goal and Platform Type
First, managers should define the objectives of a crowdsourcing platform and how reaching these goals might support their organization's strategy. 38 Next, organizations should determine what type of crowdsourcing platform is conducive to reaching these objectives. They might consider three questions:
 What crowdsourcing platform outcomes will support our strategy?
 What is the nature of tasks that could be solved on the platform that will reach these outcomes?
 How must the results of these tasks be aggregated so they can be adopted within the organization in practice?
To answer these questions, managers can use our typology of crowdsourcing (see Exhibit 1 for main goals and an indication of "good" use of different crowdsourcing platforms). Based on the type of crowdsourcing and their key objectives, managers can then choose which types of tasks should be crowdsourced and how their results should be aggregated.
BeeUp defined the objective of its crowdsourcing platform as supporting small-and mediumsized businesses in business development by transforming their problems into teaching cases, which are then used as learning materials in educational institutions (e.g., universities and vocational colleges).
Based on this goal, it became clear that the tasks to be crowdsourced on the platform would reflect open and unstructured problems so that contributions will be highly heterogeneous. Also, the managers of BeeUp concluded that a "collaborative ideation" approach that aggregates various perspectives, experiences, and skills of contributors when solving the teaching cases is highly appropriate for developing innovative solutions to such complex problems. Consequently, BeeUp opted for developing an open collaboration platform. TelcoFriends opted for crowdsourcing in order to engage contributors in performing small location-based service tasks for its customers, e.g., installing set top boxes. Because the results of these tasks are highly homogeneous, e.g., a correctly installed set top box, and are not aggregated TelcoFriends opted for a microtasking approach.
Start Small and Experiment
After having made the decision for a certain crowdsourcing approach and having established a platform, organizations should start implementing governance mechanisms. However, organizations should bear in mind that effective governance is an experiential learning process and that effective governance mechanisms may not spring into being in one fell swoop. Thus, organizations should consider pilot-testing their governance mechanisms with a series of smaller crowdsourcing projects in a noncritical environment. Also, they should think of restricting the crowd to a certain degree. In so doing, organizations are able to create room for experimentation and learn how to improve their governance mechanisms without having to fear negative consequences.
After having established an open collaboration platform, BeeUp recognized that task definition mechanisms are pivotal for obtaining high quality contributions. Thus, it started to experiment with developing different presentation styles of the case studies, different degrees of modularizing the clients' problems into independent sub-problems, and contribution requirements in terms of minimum conditions that a potential solution must meet. In this piloting phase, the number of contributors was restricted and measures for building a larger community of contributors were only taken after task definition mechanisms had reached a certain maturity. A similar approach to experimentation was taken by BahnScout when it developed its governance mechanisms. Adapting its governance, in particular incentives, to the specific needs of train enthusiasts, it restricted its operations to passengers of subways first and then expanded to other types of public transportation. In order to ensure agility for implementing changes and responding to the feedback of contributors quickly, it offered its crowdsourcing app only for the Android platform in order to reduce complexity and effort required for adaptions.
Build Up Scalable Structures
After having accomplished an effective proof of concept for the implemented governance mechanisms, organizations should consider gradually scaling up their crowdsourcing approach in terms of number of broadcasted projects and contributors involved. Current research shows that organizations that apply crowdsourcing systematically usually develop internal services that offer the organization's business units and product teams access to the crowdsourcing platform to run projects. 39 Consequently, managers responsible for crowdsourcing platforms should recognize that they are a "middleman" contributors that supervise a specific case study and also provide feedback to contributors on their case solutions. Similarly, BeeUp created intensive onboarding materials for teachers and lecturers that educated them in the sense of how they can control and manage their own class on the BeeUp platform, implementing a series of specialized functionalities for "class management." Similarly, Testbirds invested in standardization of its operations -in particular processes for task allocation and quality control -so that it could guarantee its clients that all software bugs found by the crowd are valid and can be reproduced. Also, it has created means for self-organization by offering a "self-service interface"
to its clients. Based on highly standardized governance mechanisms, its clients are now able to set up their own testing projects without active involvement of Testbirds. As a consequence, the company's assets are dramatically leveraged. success, e.g., by comparing the quality of contributions from slightly adapted task definition mechanism.
Monitor and Adjust Governance
In this regard, defining and measuring some quantitative key performance indicators might be helpful.
Quality and quantity of contributions, project runtime, or effort for conducting the crowdsourcing project may be good starting points. Organizations should also consider using a more qualitative approach and request direct feedback from contributors regarding their satisfaction. By contrast, evaluations on the platform-level are rather recommended for assessing in how far crowdsourcing contributes to the organization's overall strategy.
BeeUp measures quality of contributions, its clients' satisfaction with them, and participation of contributors for each project. Also, it directly asks contributors for qualitative feedback at the end of each completed crowdsourcing project. Once a month all obtained information are discussed and measures for further developing the governance mechanisms are worked out. A way more rigorous approach has been implemented by SAP with its SAPiens platform. It regularly runs controlled experiments in order to compare different implementations of its governance mechanisms.
Concluding Remarks
Crowdsourcing can achieve astonishing results. However, managing crowdsourcing platforms is challenging. This article provides insights on how to govern different types of crowdsourcing platforms. Companies engaging in crowdsourcing should contemplate our recommendations. In doing so, companies will be able to leverage the wisdom of crowds in a better, faster, and cheaper manner.
Notes
